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The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) resumed on 19
June 1989 with a Soviet-American arms control agreement as the
expected outcome. Despite the fact there is a partial agreement
in hand, an issue concerning strategists, planners, arms
controllers and analysts alike is the disagreement over sublimits
on intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and sea-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads or reentry vehicles (RVs). The
U.S. has proposed a sublimit of 3,000 to 3,300 on the number of
ICBM warheads to reduce Soviet reliance on this destabilizing
type of weapon system. The Soviets, on the other hand, consider
all nuclear weapons equally destabilizing and reject the U.S.
ICBM sublimit proposal unless both sides agree to impose the same
sublimit on warheads carried by SLBMs on board
submarines. Resolution of this issue will determine long term
force structures and more importantly, the credibility of the
U.S. defense posture into the future.
The purpose of this report is to advocate NOT agreeing
to ballistic missile warhead sublimits in order to allow the U.S.
the option of placing maximum reliance on sea-based strategic
forces. These forces are the most survivable, capable, flexible
and affordable we can field today and into the foreseeable
future. This approach is strategically and fiscally pertinent in
todays funding climate that targets a reduction in the Department
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of Defense (DoD) budget in the face of an ongoing struggle to
fund new untested mobile land-based strategic systems. It
follows that we should not be locked into ballistic missile
warhead sublimits involving new, unproven and potentially
vulnerable weapon systems. In other words, numerical limits
should be set, but the force mix left open to national choice.
Agreed upon START parameters to date include:
1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNLVs) total for
each sides intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy
bombers
.
6,000 accountable warheads (RVs) on the SNDVs , with not more
than 4,900 on ballistic missiles.
Total throw-weight (TW) of 50% below current Soviet levels.
If such a regime were verifiable and in place today, it
would impose U.S. force reductions more severe than the
self-imposed SALT limitations, but retain strategic stability and
codify deep strategic force reductions--a desirable arms control
outcome. On the other hand, setting a 3,000 - 3,300 maximum on
ICBM RVs might provide a near-term advantage to the U.S. by
limiting Soviet land-based first-strike weapon systems. However,
as the Ohio-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN) with the D-5 (Trident II) missile come on-line, the
strategic advantage would shift profoundly to the Soviet side for
both the mid-term and long haul.
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In the 1980s the U.S. land-based ICBM force became
vulnerable to Soviet technological advances in ICBM (RV) accuracy
and their limited Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense.
Additionally, the Soviet's began fielding mobile ICBMs that
presented unmanageable targeting problems for the U.S. At about
the same time Soviet underground command post and missile silo
hardening denied our Minuteman force the ability to destroy these
facilities. It appeared Soviet ICBMs were destabilizing and
should be limited. In response, U.S. mobile land-based missile
systems were considered. However, they remain contentious
because of high costs, concern for survivability,
political-environmental objections to their mobility and the fact
they haven't been tested and proven. Offsetting the land-based
threat with land-based forces begins to appear less appealing
than offsetting it with new improved sea-based systems.
The critical question is, are symmetrical ballistic
missile warhead sublimits for the U.S. and Soviet force structure
in the U.S. interest, and if so can they realistically be
negotiated? The Soviet Union emphasizes land-based missiles
because of
:
o Its history as a continental power
o Their lack of the domestic political and environmental
constraints present in the U.S., and
o Its large land area and comfort with an "umbilical
cord" to control forces within its borders.
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On the other hand, the U.S. stresses sea-based systems
because of:
o Their capability, flexibility and survivability (they
are invulnerable at sea with or without strategic
warning )
,
o Our population density (SSBNs on patrol do HOT act
as lightning rods for a strategic "lay down" on the
continental U.S.)
o Our advanced submarine technologies including
redundant connectivity with the National Command
Authority (NCA), and
o Our tradition as a naval power.
Within these parameters, an attempt to set agreeable and
favorable sublimits on particular system types is neither in our
interest nor realistically negotiable. It follows that 4,900
warheads on 1,600 strategic nuclear launch vehicles ( SNLVs ) with
each side free to select its own launch platforms and force mix
is the realistic and more sensible approach. In order to
maintain strategic stability at reduced levels, the U.S. must opt
for its most survivable, flexible and affordable systems for the
deterrence of nuclear war.
Today, as prior to the START talks, the Navy considers
20-22 Ohio-class SSBNS equipped with the Trident II (D-5) missile
as a force goal. This equates to 480 - 528 Trident SNLVs and
3,840 - 4,224 Trident RVs . A Soviet imposed limit of 3,000 SLBM
RVs, for example, would limit the U.S. SSBN force to 15
Ohio-class SSBNs rather than the 20-22 needed for credible
deterrence and economy of scale for cost effective operations and
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base support in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
The question is: can we deploy 20-22 Tridents leaving
only 1,060 - 676 PVs for the ICBM force and maintain strategic
stability? The affirmative argument rests upon the
survivability, capability, flexibility and known cost outlays for
the Trident SSBN and D-5 missile systems. As desirable as it may
be, for the last 15 years this country has been unable to field a
2
survivable ICBM force.
Just what makes the Trident/D-5 strategic system
desirable? The U.S.S. Ohio-class submarine exceeds design
specifications in both performance and quietness. Congress has
authorized 16 Tridents and the 17th is in the FY-90 budget
request. Each of these strategic submarines is designed for a
70/25 day deployment/turn-over cycle equating to 66% at-sea
3time. The first eight Ohio-class SSBNs are armed with the
Trident-I (C-4) ballistic missile. The U.S.S. Tennessee (SSBN
734) reached initial operational capability (IOC) in May 1989 and
will be armed with the first load of Trident-II (D-5) SLBMs in
1990. The D-5 missile production line will turn out five to six
missiles per month until the entire 726-class is fully equipped.
The D-5 SLBM is a 44-foot long, three-stage missile with
a range of about 6,000 nm's. Each missile carries eight multiple
independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The ninth of 20
scheduled missile tests from land-launch pads was completed on 21
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January 1988 with a record of eight successes and one failure.
Although the first and third submerged D-5 launch from the USS
Tennessee malfunctioned, seven subsequent shots were successful.
The sixth successful shot on 12 February 1990 officially ended
the test program. The system is "on track" and by early 1990
will be operational and competitive with all (present and
planned) U.S. land-based ICBMs.
The D-5 is hard-target capable, meaning it can destroy
command posts and hardened missile silos from safe distant
positions at sea insuring SSBN survivability now and into the
future. The SSBN can link into the NAVSTAR satellite
navigational system, and with existing on-board position keeping,
4guaranty own ship's location within 10 feet. Improved submarine
position fixing and the mid-course stellar up-dates of the D-5
missile insure that eight 150 KT highly accurate RVs can be
5delivered on target.
Survivability is a major factor favoring sea-based
forces. Despite recent Soviet advances in acoustics, Trident is
the world's quietist submarine. It maintains prelaunch
survivability through mobility in ocean space being invulnerable
to all known forms of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). ICBM forces
are based in the central portion of the U.S. whereas Trident
submarines patrol in an area about four times the entire size of
the U.S. Without doubt, the SSBN is the most survivable arm of
-6-
our strategic TRIAD. "There is no scientifically plausible
prospect for an ASW technology breakthrough which would provide a
basis for a threatening attack through the 1990 's and probably
well beyond ." There simply is no credible evidence to indicate a
"transparent ocean" is on the horizon, but air space above
land-based missiles IS transparent. If there were to be a major
ASW breakthrough, the U.S., as a world leader in this field,
would be the first to know.
On the other hand, the location of ICBM silos are well
known and missile flight paths approximate a great circle to the
target. Since an adversary has a good sense of what we target,
his active defenses will be positioned in the most favorable of
o
locations. Even with the proposed MX rail garrison and Small ICBM
(SICBM) mobile systems, several hours of warning are required to
put significant distance between the missile and its base.
Additionally, U.S. land-based missiles will be subject to
political constraints tying them to their deployment bases.
Consequently, civil authorities do not welcome rail or road
mobile missiles roaming off military reservations into their
jurisdiction. If mobile missiles only deploy in time of
increased international tension, such movement could be
interpreted by the Soviets as preparations for a preemptive
strike. Besides, in contrast to land mobile systems, the navy
has solved, practiced and demonstrated mastery of the navigation,
communications and targeting problems associated with mobile
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strategic forces. This is not the case with proposed U.S. mobile
ICBMs.
Should deterrence fail SLBMs from forward deployed
submarines, having a short time-of-f light , could be the first
strategic weapons to arrive on target. Because of SSBN
survivability, withheld SLBMs would be available for retaliatory
strikes, saved for war termination bargaining, or both. The SSBN
force provides CERTAINTY of retaliation—the crux of deterrence.
Communication reliability between the National Command
Authority (NCA) and the SLBM force under conditions of wartime
stress has been questioned by strategists and politicians.
Redundant world-wide communications are in place. Submarine UHF,
HF, LF, VLF, ELF, the USAF ' s National Emergency Airborne Command
Post (NEACF) and Emergency Rocket Communications System,
Strategic Air Command (SAC)'s Airborne Command Post (Looking
Glass), the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS-II/III
)
and the Navy's E-6A aircraft (TACAMO) system exist and work. It
is inconceivable for an SSBN on alert to miss an "Execution
Message . "
The extremely low frequency (ELF) system provides both
"bellringer " alerting information for submarines operating at
deep depths or at high speeds and operational instructions. This
low data-rate system (six - seven minutes per letter) is not
susceptible to EMP or jamming. When the submarine hears an
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alerting sequence or loses the continuous broadcast signal, it
immediately comes to communications depth and slows to monitor
other navy, air force and JCS frequencies. Additionally, a two
letter sequence on ELF can provide over 600 variant instructions
9
compiled in a code book. Since most analysts consider an "attack
from the blue" the least likely of all nuclear war scenarios,
probability is high the ELF system will provide the SSBN force
with strategic warning.
Submarines can receive traffic on ultra-high frequencies
via the fleet communication satellite (FLTSATCOM) system. When
the Military Strategic-Tactical and Relay (MILSTAR) system
becomes fully operational in the early 1990s, SSBNs will have
another jammproof communication option through frequency-shifting
techniques, and at an altitude higher than anti-satellite system
now operate. Laser communication systems are in research and
development for future submarine applications.
The issue, however, is how survivable (useable) are these
systems in a nuclear environment? The Navy is confident that
some communication links will survive providing at sea submarines
with warning and an "execution message" with the same or a higher
degree of reliability than expected for ICBMs and bombers--if the
latter survive at all! If an EAM is released, the SSBN force
will receive it. Even in the worst possible case where the NCA,
its successors, all primary and alternate command posts, ICBM
-9-
fields, bomber bases and submarine bases are destroyed in a
preemptive nuclear attack, SSBNs at sea could respond. U.S. and
allied naval and merchant ships are routinely located throughout
the world's oceans. These ships can provide high-frequency (HF)
relay for an EAM if one is released by a reconstituted U.S.
national leadership and put "on the air" by any means.
In addition to the Ohio-class SSBN being able to execute
a full range of strategic options under all conceivable
conditions when equipped with the Trident-II missile, other
fringe benefits occur. For instance, because sea-based systems
are survivable, they do not require the costly strategic
operational and warning organizations needed to provide the ICBM
and bomber forces with enough warning to preclude the "use 'em or
lose 'em" dichotomy. And, in a domestic political sense, the
SSBN system has a minimal effect on the environment.
Every indicator points to continuing SSBN system
survivability and invulnerability. The D-5 missile is designed
for both hard and soft targeting with the accuracy and yields
necessary to accommodate the widest range of strategic options.
The issue of unreliable communications with strategic submarines
simply is a non-issue.
Today's SLBM force
".
. .carries almost 50 percent of the
strategic warheads in our country's inventory for only
about 25 percent of the Department of Defense strategic
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budget . These costs represent about 10 percent of the
navy's total budget. ..."
The cost of each deliverable Trident II weapon is about $12
million, counting procurement and operations and support costs
for both the submarine and missile. This is considerably less
than the $16 million for the rail-garrison MX, or the $70 million
for the Midgetman or Small ICBM. Neither the rail-garrison MX
nor the SICBM can offer the level of survivability available to
the Soviet SS-24s and -25s because of restricted movement
resulting from U.S. political constraints.
With two thirds of the Trident force on alert at any one
time, a 20 ship force means 12 would be at sea in an ungenerated
situation, and with 22 SSBNs 13 would be at sea. Numbers cf
SSBNs could be increased, however, if START counting exempted
SSBNs in overhaul.
The D-5 is a major step in stabilizing our deterrent
posture today. However, weapons with different capabilities will
be required for the future. For example, it is known that the
Soviet Union has turned to mobility and hardening for
survivability of their strategic offensive forces. Introduction
of the land-based SS-24 and SS-25 mobile missiles and
construction of superhardened missile silos and command centers
is in progress. Many analysts believe most Soviet strategic
targets will be mobile, or "Strategic Relocatable Targets"
(SRTs), by the year 2000. The MIRVed D-5 missile is not well
-11-
suited for "counter battery fire."
SLBM modernization will consider a host of new payloads
for the D-6 and later SLBMs . Examples of these payloads include:
The Earth Penetrating Weapon (EPW) to attack deeply buried
targets. In spring of 1987 a joint Air Force-Energy
Department team found that a strengthened B8 3 nuclear bomb
casing could burrow 11 to 13 feet into frozen Alaskan
strata .
Single RV payloads for post-SIOP war fighting.
Anti-SRT payload possibilities include a payload that
releases a cruise missile that would loiter, identify then
attack the SRT. Another variation is employing a MaRV to
slow down reentry speed to permit time for SRT
identification and attack. These approaches are now
conceptual, not operational.
Because of throw-weight limitations, the probability is
that reentry vehicles with the above capabilities would only be
13
able to carry a single payload at reduced range.
Possibilities for nonlethal "combat support" payloads to
permit more SSBNs to be at sea include SPINSATs, LIGHTSATs, and
CHEAPSATs to reconstitute communications after an
Electro-magnetic Pulse (EMP) high altitude nuclear burst, or a
14
nuclear exchange. Even Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons launched
from an SSBN missile launch tube need to be considered.
If a START agreement suggests it prudent to have more
submarines carrying fewer weapons, these possibilities exist:
-12-
o Plug some launch tubes on the Ohio-class SSBN.
o Download the number of MIRVS on the D-5.
o Modify some Ohio-class launch tubes for "heavy single
payload" vehicles,
o Develop a new smaller SSBN with fewer launch tubes.
Each of these options, individually or in combination,
has advantages and disadvantages that must be assessed.
Plugging "x" number of the Trident launch tubes would
allow more submarine platforms to operate at sea thereby forcing
the Soviets to search larger areas for more and less valuable
targets. For ships being built this is easier than for existing
submarines in terms of verification. Plugging tubes may involve
intrusive inspections to be acceptable to the U.S.S.R. Also, it
would increase the overall sea-based force cost per warhead on
target
.
Downloading RVs on MIRVed missiles presents similar
problems as plugging missile tubes; that is, verification and
higher cost per warhead on target. Production monitoring,
tagging and post-deployment inspection are likely outcomes.
Additionally, it would open a real opportunity for strategic
"breakout" by cheating on either side unless extremely intrusive
inspection measures are negotiated. On the plus side, fewer RVs
equates to longer ranges. In all probability, a completely new
missile would be demanded by the Soviet Union if the number of
accountable RVs were to be less than eight.
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Modifying missile launch tubes for "heavy single
payloads" also flies in the face of verification. Undoubtedly,
there would have to be significant observable modifications,
verifiable by national technical means to take this path. An
alternative would be to modify six to eight SSBNs with special
"heavy single payload" launchers not compatible with C-4 or D-5
missiles. These vessels would have to be on patrol cycles with
D-5 armed SSBNs for maximum flexibility and deterrent stability.
This option offers a "hedge" against a continued Soviet shift to
mobile and single RV strategic offensive forces by allowing the
U.S. more Trident submarines and providing a bonus of ASAT and
communications reconstitution capability.
Developing a new smaller SSBN with fewer launch tubes, on
first impression, sounds attractive. However, when one considers
that the Ohio-class is in production, is quiet, and meets or
exceeds all its design specifications one is hard pressed to
suggest "start-up" for a newer and less capable SSBN at todays
inflationary costs. Besides, it is basic in submarine design
that "stealth equals quiet equals big." Sound-quieting of
rotating machinery is volume and cost-intensive. The noisiest
nuclear submarines are the smallest, the U.S. NR-1 and the Soviet
Alfa-class. Trident and Typhoon are large and quiet. Until
passive acoustics are replaced by futuristic non-acoustic proven
technologies for ASW, large submerged platforms will be required
17for stealth.
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What then would make a sensible strategic offensive
deterrent force at the onset of a START regime without
sublimits? Capt. Linton F. Brooks, USN may have summed it up
best when he wrote:
Impressive new capabilities gained by the
deployment of the Trident II submarine-launched
ballistic missile, declining political support for
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and
continued questioning of the viability of strategic
bombers will combine to .thrust the mantle of strategic
preeminence on the Navy.
Assuming the Ohio-class SSBNs armed with D-5 missiles,
initially there could be 20-22 TRIDENTS, 50 MX, a minimum of 186
Minuteman ICBMs and depending upon counting rules, an affordable
mix of manned bomber aircraft to fill in the remaining 884 SNLVs
carrying 1,100 RVs . Such a force seems smart for a START today.
Without sublimits, and by downloading SLBMs or substituting
combat support payloads, additional submarines (or land-based
missiles) could be deployed if advancing technologies warrant
changes in our force mix. The point is, at reduced START levels
and with severe budget constraints, a maximum deterrent posture
with tested survivable, capable, flexible and affordable forces
exists in the TRIDENT SSBN/D-5 system, leaving future options
open to make changes if needed.
-15-
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